#The division crash to desktop groups how to#
#The division crash to desktop groups android#
#The division crash to desktop groups code#

As you can see in the table above, the visit to Yahoo was immediately redirected to this suspicious URL with database ID 16120. The URL com:30495/szev4hz immediately appeared suspicious, particularly because of the presence of a 4th level subdomain, a non-standard high port number, and a random URI similar to links contained in SMS messages previously documented in connection to NSO Group’s Pegasus. ( Please note: throughout this document we escaped malicious domains with the marking to prevent accidental clicks and visits.) For example, in one case we noticed a redirect to an odd-looking URL after Maati Monjib attempted to visit Yahoo: However, on further analysis we also noticed suspicious redirects recorded in Safari’s browsing history. As a result, similar messages emerged from our analysis of the phone of Moroccan activist Maati Monjib, who was one of the activists targeted as documented in Amnesty International’s 2019 report. Numerous public reports had identified NSO Group’s customers using SMS messages with Pegasus exploit domains over the years. In this first section we detail the process which led to the discovery of these compromises. Amnesty International’s Security Lab began refining its forensics methodology through the discovery of attacks against HRDs in Morocco in 2019, which were further corroborated by attacks we discovered against a Moroccan journalist in 2020. Discovering Pegasus network injection attacksĪmnesty International’s technical investigation into NSO Group’s Pegasus intensified following our discovery of the targeting of an Amnesty International staffer and a Saudi activist, Yahya Assiri, in 2018.

#The division crash to desktop groups code#

Individuals who have been anonymized have been assigned an alphanumeric code name in this report. Names of several of the civil society targets in the report have been anonymized for safety and security reasons. We are publishing a set of 700 Pegasus-related domains. Repeated operational security mistakes have allowed the Amnesty International Security Lab to maintain continued visibility into this infrastructure.

NSO Group has redesigned their attack infrastructure by employing multiple layers of domains and servers. This evidence has been collected from the phones of HRDs and journalists in multiple countries.įinally, in section 9 the report documents the evolution of the Pegasus network infrastructure since 2016. Sections 1 to 8 of this report outline the forensic traces left on mobile devices following a Pegasus infection. Most recently, a successful “zero-click” attack has been observed exploiting multiple zero-days to attack a fully patched iPhone 12 running iOS 14.6 in July 2021. Zero-click attacks have been observed since May 2018 and continue until now. These also include so-called “zero-click” attacks which do not require any interaction from the target. The Pegasus attacks detailed in this report and accompanying appendices are from 2014 up to as recently as July 2021. This includes forensic records linking recent Pegasus infections back to the 2016 Pegasus payload used to target the HRD Ahmed Mansoor.

#The division crash to desktop groups android#

This report documents the forensic traces left on iOS and Android devices following targeting with the Pegasus spyware. In this Forensic Methodology Report, Amnesty International is sharing its methodology and publishing an open-source mobile forensics tool and detailed technical indicators, in order to assist information security researchers and civil society with detecting and responding to these serious threats. In order to meet that responsibility, NSO Group must carry out adequate human rights due diligence and take steps to ensure that HRDs and journalists do not continue to become targets of unlawful surveillance. This research has uncovered widespread, persistent and ongoing unlawful surveillance and human rights abuses perpetrated using NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.Īs laid out in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, NSO Group should urgently take pro-active steps to ensure that it does not cause or contribute to human rights abuses within its global operations, and to respond to any human rights abuses when they do occur.

Īmnesty International’s Security Lab has performed in-depth forensic analysis of numerous mobile devices from human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists around the world.

This report accompanies the release of the Pegasus Project, a collaborative investigation that involves more than 80 journalists from 17 media organizations in 10 countries coordinated by Forbidden Stories with technical support of Amnesty International’s Security Lab. This Forensic Methodology Report shows that neither of these statements are true.

NSO Group claims that its Pegasus spyware is only used to “investigate terrorism and crime” and “leaves no traces whatsoever”.

#The division crash to desktop groups how to#

Research JForensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s PegasusĪ copy of this report is available for download here.